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CASE COMMENTS
50 per cent of the stock of the transferee is controlled by the
transferor or its sharesholders; but, Congress rejected this pro-
posal. 2 A few commentators feel that the adoption of such a
proposal would solve many of the problems surrounding a liquida-
tion-reincorporation.3
Thus it is imperative that the tax advisor be extremely cautious
when confronted with a transaction in the area of reincorporation.
Inconsiderate action could easily result in heavy economic loss for
the taxpayer-client. A liquidation-reincorporation transaction that
is bona fide in every respect and which involves either less than a
transfer of "substantially all" the assets or more than 20 per cent
change in stock ownership will result in capital gains treatment.
But the taxpayer runs the risk of having a judicial tribunal determine
the bona fides of his intent with respect to a liquidation-reincor-
poration. There is also a possibility that the court may attempt
judicial legislation and relax standards so that it will be easier
for the Commissioner to bring a liquidation-reincorporation within
the reorganization provision of the Code. The present state of the
law does not seem to be adequate from the standpoint of the
Treasury in that it allows a corporation to bail out earnings at
capital gains rates while the business is continued in essentially
the same manner with a new corporate front. The result is a tax
loophole which should be corrected. The possibility of specific
legislation makes it presently desirable to carefully consider any
attempted or potential liquidation-reincorporation. If a liquidation-
reincorporation is treated as a reorganization, it could cost the
taxpayer-client thousands of tax dollars.
Jacob Michael Robinson
Labor Law-Bargaining in Good Faith-Union's Right to Conduct
Time Studies on Company Property
U, union, represents employees in the plant of C, company,
where wages are based upon a "piece-rate system." To establish
rates, C conducts time studies to determine normal work pace, then
provides a bonus for higher levels of productivity. U filed griev-
32 Proposed Section 357 liquidation followed by reincorporation, con-
tained in H.R. 8300 as passeA by the House, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
33 See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 159.
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ances on certain of these piece-rates and eventually requested all
time study data which the company had used to determine these
rates. The material was furnished, but U's representative was dis-
satisfied, because of unclear use of "adjustment factors" in the com-
pany's data. When C would not account for these figures to U's
satisfaction, U's representative requested permission to conduct his
own time studies so that he could intelligently advise U whether
to accept the rates established by C, or invoke arbitration, the final
step in the grievance procedure. C refused to grant the request and
U filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board,
charging failure to bargain in good faith. The Board held that
Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations
Act were violated by the refusal to permit access to the plant
for the purpose of conducting independent time studies. Held,
order enforced. A union-conducted time study would provide the
only means for full assessment and verification of employer's
proposed piece work rates. Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d
716 (2d Cir. 1966).
This case represents yet another extension of the employer's duty
to bargain, especially with respect to the obligation to provide in-
formation within the employer's possession.
Under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, a duty
is imposed upon both employers and unions to bargain collectively
with each other "in good faith."' The state of mind necessary
to constitute "bargaining in good faith" on the part of the parties
is often difficult to define. Hence, the required bargaining "in
good faith" has taken many forms. One long established principle
is that an employer has an affirmative duty to furnish economic
information sufficient to enable the union to bargain intelligently
and to discuss issues raised by the employer.2 Economic information
has been held to include such items as time-study information,'
incentive rates,4 and even individual employees' earning records.'
An employer is relieved of his duty only when furnishing the in-
' National Labor Relations Act § 8a(5), 8b(3), 8d; 29 U.S.C. §158a(5),
158b(3), 158d (1958).
2 Matter of Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
3 J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 253 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1958).
4 Dixie Mfg Co., 79 NLRB 645 (1948), enforced 180 F.2d 173 (6th Cir.
1950).
- NLRB v. Item Co., 220 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1955).
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formation would cause him undue hardship or when the union
can obtain the information as easily as the employer.6
The duty to provide information was applied originally to the
period of contract negotiations between the union and the em-
ployer. However, in the last few years a new trend has been
noted. In more recent cases, the right to relevant economic informa-
tion has been held to include "the processing of a grievance under
the bargaining agreement and the union's bona fide actions in ad-
ministering the bargaining agreement during the period of its
existance."I
The theory behind this concept appears to be that collective
bargaining is a continuing process requiring many periodic ad-
justments in matters not covered or contemplated in existing agree-
ments. The rights secured under a contract require constant policing
and administration by a union if it is to fulfill its obligation to
bargain intelligently on behalf of its members. Since matters of dis-
agreement between union and management come within the scope
of the contract by means of the grievance procedure mechanism,
the grievance procedure is a part of this continuous collective
bargaining process.'
In most instances, the information which the unions could request
from employers has consisted of written records within the com-
pany's exclusive control. But, if we are to assume that the princi-
pal case is indicative of future holdings, it now appears that the
mere furnishing of written records will not always terminate
the employer's duty to provide information.
In the instant case, the NLRB found that the employer's records
were inadequate for proper verification of the company's proposed
piece-rates. Therefore, the Board traveled the "next step" and
6 Boston Herald-Traveler Corp. v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1955);
NLRB v. Whitin Machine Works, 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954); NLRB v.
Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1951).7 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLB, 325 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1963);
NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 352 U.S. 938 (1956); J. I. Case Co. v.
NLB, 253 F.2d 149 (7th Cir.); NLRB v. Item Co., 220 F.2d 956 (5th Cir.
1955); Boston Herald-Traveler Corp. v. NLBB, 223 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1955);
NLRB v. Whitin Machine Works, 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954).8 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574,581 (1960).
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stated that failure to grant the union access to the plant for the
purpose of conducting time studies constituted a failure to bargain
in good faith.
This ruling granting the union access to company property raised
the question of the right of the company to close its doors to out-
siders. In meeting this issue, the court found it necessary to reason
around the holding in NLRB v. Otis Elevator Co." In that decision,
revising an NLRB order to permit union time studies on company
property, this same circuit court stated that while there is a duty
to furnish time study information to a union, the employer was
not required "to open its plant to union representatives to enable
them to make new time studies. . . ."' To allow non-employee
union representatives to enter the plant would be an "invasion"
of the company's property rights which should not be allowed.
Yet, even with such apparently unambiguous statements, the
court distinguished Otis in at least two respects. First, the company
in Otis rejected not only the request of the union to make its own
time study, but also the request for written time study information
in the company's possession. Thus, the court found that it was
impossible to determine whether the union needed to conduct its
own studies. Second, the court held that whatever additional
information the union required beyond the company's data could be
obtained from interviews with union members. In the instant
case, however, the court stated that the information needed to
evaluate the company's data, while subjective in nature, was "never-
theless within the Company's exclusive control."
In its desire to let the principle of stare decisis rule, the court
is seemingly drawing some fine distinctions to overcome its earlier
wording in Otis. In actuality, it appears that the instant case over-
turns Otis for all intents and purposes.
Thus, it seems that an employer's property rights can no longer
be asserted to prevent a union from conducting its own time study.
This would probably not be true, however, where the employer
establishes that such studies would "severely disrupt production."
The problem was not met here, for the company charged only that
9 208 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1953).10Id. at 177.
11 Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1966).
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some employees might be distracted, an argument which the
court readily dismissed as inconsequental.
The court predicated much of its reasoning on the property
"invasion" issue on the fact that union representatives have been
granted access to company premises under other circumstances
covered by the National Labor Relations Act. These include the
right to use company property for organizational purposes,'2
and for soliciting membership.'3 There is some weakness in this
argument, for in these instances, non-employee union members were
granted access only to non-production areas. The court dispensed
with this by saying that to forbid access to production areas in this
case would be "contrary to the purpose Congress intended the
[National Labor Relations] Act to serve."
The company presented one other argument in this case which
should be considered. It contended that since the governing
agreement with the union failed to mention independent time
studies, this constituted a waiver, preventing the union from
raising the issue.
Generally speaking, for a union to waive its right to information,
it must do so "clearly and unmistakably." Thus, silence normally
will not be construed as a waiver of the right to information simply
because the right was not established in the collective bargaining
contract. 4 In keeping with this principle, it has been held that no
waiver occurred where the right to wage information was "needed
to administer the bargaining agreement," and therefore "was a right
which it had under section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations
Act.' s
On the other hand, a waiver may be effected where a union,
during negotiation, contracts for some information and abandons
its contract demands for certain additional information.'6 The
12 NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1946).
1' NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948).
14 NLRB v. Perkins Machine Co., 326 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1964); Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1963); J. I. Case Co. v.
NLRB, 253 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1958); NLRB v. New Britain Machine Co.,
210 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1954); NLRB v. J. H. Allison Co., 165 F.2d 766
(6th Cir. 1948).
's NLRB v. Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1951).
,6 Hearst Corp., 113 NLRB 1067 (1955).
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union cannot then demand this additional information. Its right has
been waived.
Many developments are occurring in labor law concerning the
duty to bargain in good faith. In the instant case, there is further
extension of the duty to bargain in post contractual relations where
there is a grievance-arbitration clause. Furthermore, there is an
expansion of the employer's duty to provide information to the
union so that it now includes the granting of access to company
property for union conducted time studies. Consequently, the
trend toward a wider duty to bargain continues apace, with this
case marking its latest step.
Edward Perry Johnson
Labor Relations-Employer's Duty to Bargain
Over Subcontracting--Waiver
One type of maintenance work at Allied Chemical involved
scheduled repairs, such as machine improvement and minor con-
struction. In the past this work had been performed both by
company employees and outside contractors. During negotiations
leading to the collective bargaining agreement, the union attempted
to secure a commitment from the employer which would have
restricted the company's right to unilaterally subcontract this type
of work. After full discussion of the issue, the union consented to a
contract which did not include the restriction. Two months after
the collective bargaining agreement was signed by the parties, the
union requested the employer to notify and bargain with it
respecting the company's decisions to subcontract this type of
maintenance work. The company refused to notify the union before
the work was subcontracted. No employees in the maintenance
department were laid off or discharged as a result of the em-
ployer's unilateral subcontracting. The union filed a section
8(a) (5)' charge with the National Labor Relations Board.
I "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees...-" Labor Management
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